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Abstract 
 
This paper examines security price reactions of European demergers.  For a period ranging 
from one and a half years prior to the demerger announcement through to three years after the 
execution date, the relative performance of the parent, spin-off and the combined effect is 
analysed relative to the overall market performance.  Significant announcement effects were 
established for a sample of 48 European demergers.  In addition, significant positive long-
term value creation, in particular in year 2 after the demerger, was found for the spin-off but 
not for the parent firm.  While size has, on average, a decisive but inverse impact on 
performance for both parent and spin-off, takeover activity does not. 
 
Keywords:  Corporate restructuring, demerger,  spin-off. 
 
 
 
 
 
This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Labour Markets Programme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
Thomas Kirchmaier is a Research Assistant at the Centre for Economic Performance and 
lecturer at the Interdisciplinary Institute of Management, London School of Economics.   
 Correspondence to:  Thomas Kirchmaier, IIM, London School of Economics, 
Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE.  Email:  t.kirchmaier@lse.ac.uk  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Published by 
Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 
London  WC2A 2AE 
 
Ó Thomas Kirchmaier, submitted December 2002 
 
ISBN 0 7530 1626 5 
 
Individual copy price:  £5 
 The Performance Effects of European Demergers 
 
Thomas Kirchmaier 
 
May 2003 
 
 
1. Introduction 1 
 
2. Theoretical Reasons for Demergers 1 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 2 
 
4. Data and Methodology 5 
 4.1 Sample selection 5 
 4.2 Methodology 7 
 4.3 Performance measure 7 
 
5. Results/Empirical Findings 10 
 5.1 Pre-Announcement performance 10 
 5.2 Announcement effect 11 
 5.3 Ex-date effect 14 
 5.4 Post-demerger transaction 14 
 
6. Conclusion 21 
 
Appendices  22 
 
References  37 
 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance is financed by the Economic and Social Research Council 
1 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper investigates the short- and long-term effects of the demerger of European 
companies on shareholder wealth.  In a demerger, usually referred to in the US as a spin-off, 
a firm is broken up into two or more independent entities.  In the process a wholly owned 
subsidiary becomes an independent entity, with its shares being distributed to the 
shareholders of the parent company on a pro-rata basis.  This process is considered to be a 
non-cash dividend by the parent firm and is tax-free provided that a substantial proportion 
(though not necessarily all) of the shares in the spin-off are distributed to the shareholders at 
no cost.  In contrast to prior research, this paper analyses European as opposed to North 
American demergers and looks at the share price reaction over a much longer period from 1.5 
years prior the demerger announcement to 3 years after the separation.  Between 1989 and 
1999, a significant positive announcement effect is documented for 48 voluntary European 
demergers that are preceded by a period of significant underperformance by the parent 
company.  Moreover, spin-offs – but not parent firms - show significant positive abnormal 
returns up to three years after the demerger. 
 
 
2. Theoretical Reasons for Demergers 
 
Demergers were an American invention of the 1920s and became common since the 1950s.  
In 1980, the British Chancellor of the Exchequer introduced tax incentives for demergers to 
facilitate the de-conglomeration of the British industry.  In continental Europe, demergers are 
a relatively recent phenomena, in part initiated by legislation drawn up by the European 
Commission in 1990. 
 At first sight, it is far from obvious how a ‘simple’ break-up of an organisation into 
smaller units would create value.  “If there are no synergies between the parent and the 
subsidiary, the sum of the post-divestitures’ cash flows would equal the combined cash flow 
had the two units remained as one” (Hite and Owers, 1983, p. 411).  The value of two 
business units should be identical before and after a demerger, unless some positive or 
negative synergies exist that create or destroy value under a combined ownership structure. 
 A demerger is therefore a sensible option if negative synergies or diseconomies of 
scale exist that can be eliminated by separating the firm into two or more independent 
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entities.  Possible explanations for such a value creation are plentiful and can be broadly 
categorised into five different types. 
 
a. Dismantling of conglomerates.  Historically, demergers were used to dismantle 
conglomerates after it became apparent that the costs of running such organisational 
structures outweighed the benefits in the economic environment of the 1980s and 
1990s.  The ‘dismantling of conglomerates’ argument is widely based on the idea of 
removing inefficient organisational structures and hence the elimination of negative 
synergies. 
 
b. Organisational improvements.  From an organisational perspective, value can be 
created through the elimination of misfits in the strategic focus or organisational 
properties of the organisation.  In addition, the reduction of the size of an organisation 
leads to an over-proportional reduction in ‘information loss’ within the hierarchy. 
 
c. Capital market improvements.  More focused units might improve access to the 
capital market or attract a new set of investors, thereby eliminating barriers to growth 
from a capital market perspective. 
 
d. Corporate Governance improvements.  Value creation through improvements in the 
role and function of the head office, improvements in the structuring of managerial 
incentives and more effective market based governance mechanisms due to increased 
transparency. 
 
e. Bondholder expropriation.  Value redistribution from bondholders to shareholders 
through a reduction of quality of the collateral provided (Hite and Owers, 1983). 
 
 
3. Empirical Evidence 
 
The empirical literature currently available on the performance effects of demergers is largely 
limited to the experience of US firms.  This can be explained by the longer history and the 
higher frequency of demergers in the US as compared to Europe. 
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 The first empirical paper1 on this subject was published by Miles and Rosenfeld 
(1983), analysing announcement effects of 55 demergers/spin-offs between 1963 and 1980.  
Analysing a time period ranging from 120 trading days before, to 60 trading days after, the 
demerger announcement, they found a statistically significant 2 cumulative average adjusted 
return of 22%. 
 The immediate announcement effect (i.e. at day zero and day one) is +3.3%, for the 
longer period from day –10 to day +10 it is +7.6%3.  This indicates a noteworthy positive 
assessment of demergers by the market.  Most surprising of all is the considerable value 
creation between the days –120 to –11 before the demerger announcement.  Although 
puzzling, this phenomenon is broadly consistent with the findings of this paper. 
 Schipper and Smith (1983) studied 93 voluntary demerger announcements between 
1963 and 1981.  Using a market model (CAPM), they established a significant positive 
announcement effect of approximately +2.8% for a two-day announcement period.  They also 
noted that most spun-off subsidiaries (72 out of the total of 93 firms) were operating in 
dissimilar industries to the parent firm.  For 18 out of the 93 transactions, regulatory pressure 
was the reported prime motive.  The market rewarded those transactions with an average 
abnormal return of +5.07% compared with +2.29% for the remainder of the sample. 
 Hite and Owers (1983) studied the security price reactions of 123 voluntary 
demergers between 1963 and 1981, and established a statistically significant positive 
cumulative abnormal return of +7% for the period ranging from 50 days prior to the 
announcement through to the completion date.  Of this, +3.3% took place in the two-day 
period from day –1 to day 0. 
 Copeland, Lemgruber and Mayers (1987) extended the above research by comparing 
two different samples.  The first sample with no post-selection bias included all firms that had 
announced a demerger decision; the second sample suffering from a post-selection bias only 
contained firms that both announced and executed the demerger.  Copeland et al. established 
that the two-day abnormal return for the fixed sample is +3.03%, whereas for the re-balanced 
sample it is +2.49%.  In addition, he established that about 11% of all firms never executed 
their announced demergers, a result that is roughly in line with the findings of this study.  
These results are based on a sample of demergers that occurred between 1962 and 1983.   
                                                 
1  The first empirical paper was in fact by Kudla and McInish (1983) but is of doubtful quality as it 
analyses only six firms. 
2  Significant at the 1% level. 
3  Both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
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 In the most recent study, Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) analysed the 
performance of a sample of 146 demergers taking place between 1965 and 1988.  As in this 
paper, it analyses a much longer time-period ranging from six months to three years 
following the execution date of the demerger.  Announcement effects were excluded from the 
research.  Their research indicates that “both the spin-off and their parents offer significantly 
positive abnormal returns for up to three years beyond the spin-off announcement date” 
(Cusatis et al., 1993, p. 294). 
 
 
Table 1:  Announcement Effect of Demergers  
 
Author(s) Year Sample 
Period  
Sample Size Investigation 
Period 
Result 
Miles and 
Rosenfeld  
1983 1963-1980 55 -10 to +10 +7.6% 
Schipper and 
Smith 
1983 1963-1981 93 -1, 0 +2.8% 
Hite and 
Owers 
1983 1963-1981 123 -50 to 0 
-1, 0 
+7.0% 
+3.3% 
Copeland et 
al.  
1987 1962-1983 73  +2.5% 
 
 
Using matched firm adjusted returns, the cumulative positive average abnormal return for the 
parent in each of the three years following the demerger are +4.5%, +25.0% and +33.6%.  
For the spin-off, the corresponding results are +12.5%, +26.7% and +18.1% respectively.  Of 
particular interest is the exceptionally good performance of both parent and spin-off in the 
second year after the demerger.  However, after a closer examination of the distribution4 it 
becomes apparent that laggards and high performers almost balance each other out, albeit 
with a slight majority of the latter.  Both parent and spin-off had created considerable value 
above and beyond their peer groups in the three years following the demerger execution.  
This indicates that the market might not have fully anticipated the likely value creation at the 
time of the demerger announcement.   
 These authors discovered that both the parent and the spin-off were more likely to be 
subsequently taken over than their matched firms; spin-offs about four times, and parent 
firms about two and a half times as much.  Given their method of calculation, the researchers 
                                                 
4  For both parent and spin-off. 
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could establish that after controlling for the takeover premium, the statistically significant 
positive long-run effect for both parent and spin-off disappeared5.   
 According to this research, the potential value gains that were not anticipated at the 
time of the demerger announcement are attributable to two effects:  a strong effect from an 
incorrect evaluation of the takeover probability for the two or more parts of the firm; and a 
much smaller effect from other unknown sources. 
 
 
4. Data and Methodology 
 
4.1. Sample selection 
 
This paper aims to ana lyse European demergers.  Demergers are considered European if the 
parent company was located in one of the countries of the European Economic Area.  
Demergers were identified using several European press databases in FT Profile and, in a 
second step, verified via annual reports and Datastream.  The performance effects of 
demergers were measured using share price performance relative to the overall market 
indices.  These were collected using Datastream.  The announcement date (‘day 0’) was 
defined as the day when the news broke to the market and the execution date as the first day 
of trading for the spin-off.  The time period under investigation was between 1989 and 1999.  
Following the demerger, the sample was divided into parent and spin-off.  Those parts of the 
firm that kept the original name were identified as parents.  Those firms that executed their 
announced demerger are labelled as standard demerger.   
 A preliminary attempt was made to divide the sample into two groups by the degree 
of product relatedness between parent and spin-off, as measured by the two-digit SIC code.  
It was however established that most demergers actually occurred between unrelated lines of 
business.  As the related sample was very small and the results insignificant, they are not 
reported here6. 
                                                 
Note:  In this case, returns are computed with the assumption of a buy and hold strategy.  If a firm is also 
delisted or is being taken over, the longest available return is used to present the whole period.  The researchers 
adjust for takeover premiums by removing the six-month period prior to the merger/takeover from the sample. 
6  As the expected gains can be highest from demergers of unrelated lines of business, most of the 
demergers were found to be of this nature.  The remaining sample of five firms with related demergers was very 
small, and for some of the smaller firms and countries there was data available for the line of business the 
companies were engaged in.  Due to the small number of firms in the sample, the results are statistically 
insignificant and are not reported in this paper. 
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 The sample was also stratified by size, whereas each sample was divided by market 
capitalisation at the announcement and execution dates7.  Four samples were thus created, 
dividing firms into small and large based upon their market capitalisation at the 
announcement and execution date.  The former sample (pre-demerger selection) allows us to 
derive information about the possible impact of a firm’s initial size on the demerger 
performance, the latter (post-demerger selection) on the impact of size of the new entity on 
value creation following the demerger.   
 In addition, further homogeneous subgroups were created for demergers that were 
announced but never executed (aborted demergers) as well as technical demergers.  Technical 
demergers were so classified if one of the constituent parts was in a simultaneous process of 
merging and demerging8. 
 Two different samples were collected to test for the performance effects of demergers.  
The first, re-balanced sample was designed to include the maximum number of firms.  This 
means that the sample varies from period to period due to natural drop out, mergers and 
acquisitions and the unavailability of data.  The second, fixed sample includes firms for 
which a full set of data is available for the entire period under investigation. 
 The re-balanced sample consists of 48 firms in total.  Of those, 38 demergers9 were 
either completed or were in the process of being completed10.  Another five demergers were 
classified as technical demergers, with the remaining five demergers having been announced 
but never completed (aborted demerger). 
 The second, fixed sample consists of 21 parents and 23 spin-offs.  In contrast, the 
dynamic sample consists of 34 parent and 41 spin-off firms at the execution date.  With 
technical demergers included, the sample size is 38 and 46 respectively.  Multiple spin-offs 
cause the number of spin-off firms to exceed the number of parents.  In the case of multiple 
simultaneous spin-offs, the parent firm was included in the post-demerger sample only 
once11.  Where a multiple sequential spin-off occurred within three years following the 
demerger, the parent firm was dropped from the post-demerger sample 10 trading days before 
                                                 
7  The sample was divided into two groups of equal proportion.  Given the fact that every division of a 
sample into large and small firms is somewhat random, it was felt that the most appropriate form of dividing the 
sample was split into two groups of equal size. 
8  Technical demergers were excluded from the standard demerger group. 
9  One demerger announcement can lead to more than one spin-off. 
10  In three cases, the demerger was announced but not yet completed. 
11  For the four-way split of Hanson, Hanson (building materials) was categorised as a spin-off, not a 
parent firm. 
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the announcement date.  Following the execution date, the parent group contains 15 large 
firms12, and 18 small firms 13; the spin-offs are 21 and 19 respectively. 
 
4.2. Methodology 
 
The analysis is divided into four parts:  the pre-announcement period; the announcement 
period, the execution date phase as well as the time after the demerger. 
 To establish the pre-announcement characteristics of the sample, a period of 400 
trading days or slightly more than 1.5 years preceding the announcement was selected.  Event 
study methodology was used to test the announcement effects (Fama et al., 1969, and 
Sirower, 1997).  A set of five time windows was studied ranging from a 2 to 21 day periods.  
To test for ex-date effects, returns are calculated for the five days following the demerger 
execution. 
 The post-demerger period under consideration spans over 780 trading days 
(approximately 3 years) following the demerger transaction.  It would be unnecessary to 
study the post-demerger period if a perfectly efficient financial market could be assumed.  
The value creation should have been foreseen and discounted at the announcement date, and 
no significant abnormal return should be identifiable.  However, various authors (e.g. 
Sirower, 1997 and Limmack, 1991) have indicated that the market seems to systematically 
under- or overestimate the long-term performance effects of mergers and acquisitions at the 
announcement date.   
 Over this three-year period, a substantial number of firms disappeared from the 
sample due to their subsequent acquisition or the natural dropout from the sample. 
 
4.3. Performance measure  
 
The analysis of the performance effects of demergers relies on market-based measures.  Such 
measurement is preferable to accounting-based measures as it allows the comparison of 
European data without regard for different national accounting conventions14.   
                                                 
12  Of the 19 firms that were identified as large firms before the demerger, three were not yet standard, and 
one firm (Hanson) split itself into too many small parts to allow meaningful conclusions to be drawn from it.  
Hanson was dropped from the large sample. 
13  Of the 19 small firms that were identified as such before the demerger, one was taken private, one 
taken out of the sample due to illiquid trading, and one (Saveland-Hercules) was included after the demerger 
only. 
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 Based on the market adjusted return model, the performance of the individual stock is 
compared to the performance of the overall market index; hence daily15 abnormal returns 
(Ai,t) are calculated for each individual security i at time t as follows: 
 
tmtiti RRA ,,, -=  
 
where Ri,t is the actual return or raw return of the security i on day t, and Rm,t  is the return on 
the respective market index on day t.  Compared with the market model described below, this 
method has the advantage that it is free from the parameter bias of the estimation period, a 
problem which is particularly severe when studying demergers over a long investigation 
period. 
 In a second step, the abnormal returns (Ai,t) are accumulated for each firm in the 
sample over the investigation period (CRi) and then averaged across all firms in the sample.   
 Cumulative average abnormal returns (CAR) are hence calculated as follows: 
 
å
=
=
N
i
iCRN
CAR
1
1
  where   å
=
=
T
t
tii ACR
1/0
,  
 
N denotes the number of firms in the sample, CRi the cumulative abnormal return of firm i.  
Cumulative abnormal returns (CRi) are calculated starting at day 0 for the calculation of post-
demerger performance effects, otherwise starting at day 1.  This calculation method is based 
on a buy-and-hold investment strategy to avoid the bias associated with portfolio rebalancing. 
 However, to allow the illustration of the results in a graphical format, this 
methodology needs to be adapted.  The adaptation is based on a daily-rebalanced portfolio.  
With a deliberate trade-off between preciseness and vividness in mind, the second method is 
adopted.  The average of the above abnormal returns (ARi) for firm i is calculated, and 
accumulated over the period under investigation.  The cumulative average abnormal returns 
(CAR) are then calculated as follows: 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
14  To test for the performance effects of demergers, Sirower’s (1997) methodology to evaluate the 
performance effects of mergers is adopted. 
15  It was suggested by Brown and Warner (1980) to calculate two -day abnormal returns to avoid an 
overestimation of abnormal returns.  Tests performed on this sample established that there are no estimation 
differences between calculating daily and two-day abnormal returns. 
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where Nt is the number of firms in the sample on day t.   
 The results of this second method can be found in Figures 1 and 4.  As can be seen, 
these charts overestimate the abnormal returns when compared with the preceding tables.  
Such overestimation is documented in the literature (see for example:  Blume and 
Stambaugh, 1983 and Roll, 1983).  Whereas the results presented below are based on a buy 
and hold strategy, the methodology used to compute the figure data is based on the daily re-
balancing of the portfolio.  The different calculation methods employed produce slightly 
different results, as “individual asset returns are not as well-behaved as we might like” (Roll, 
1983, p. 372).  In most instances, however, the reported performance difference is well below 
2% over the 780 trading day period.  The charts are intended to give a graphical illustration of 
the value creation properties over time, and are not intended to provide a precise reading of 
the cumulative abnormal returns. 
 The market adjusted return model has some further limitations.  It can be seen as a 
restricted market model that is based on the CAPM model.   
 The market adjusted return model implicitly assumes that the ‘ai (of this CAPM 
model) is constrained to be zero, and ßi constrained to be one’ (MacKinlay, 1997, p. 18).  In 
most if not all of the cases, it can be assumed that the ß for the individual security is not one, 
introducing a certain measurement bias.  The situation is further complicated by the fact that 
the betas (individual risk of security i) will be different before and after the demerger.  It can 
be assumed that the betas are increasing with the reduction of size in a demerger.  It is 
impossible to adjust for the bias arising from the imposed restriction of beta to be one, and of 
the changes in beta after the demerger.  Brown and Warner (1980), however, could establish 
that the market adjusted return model is as good as any other method in measuring abnormal 
returns, indicating that the introduced measurement bias is small compared to the overall 
effect. 
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5. Results/Empirical findings 
 
5.1. Pre-announcement performance 
 
The pre-announcement period focuses on the 400 trading days prior to the demerger 
announcement.  Over this period standard demergers outperformed the market by 
approximately 2%, albeit not statistically significant.  The median value for this period was 
5%.  Disentangling the data further shows a very different picture.  Over the 100 trading day 
period between day 300 and day 201 prior to the demerger, the firms underperformed the 
market by 6% and in the following 100-day period by another 5%.16,17.  The decline in share 
price was on average reversed over the last 100-day period before the demerger 
announcement.  Looking at the various subgroups, it becomes apparent that in most cases, 
future demerger candidates significantly underperformed the market up to one year before the 
demerger announcement.  Large firms fared better than small ones.  The firms whose 
demerger was later cancelled did perform particularly poorly, significantly underperforming 
the market by about 45% over the entire 400-day period. 
 Table 2 depicts a brief summary of the mean values over this period for some main 
and sub-categories, while the more extensive tables and figures can be found in Appendix 1 
and 4 respectively.  The term ‘all demergers’ includes all standard demergers, technical 
demergers and aborted demergers.  Standard demergers are defined as executed demergers.  
The corresponding mean value for all standard demergers is plotted in Figure 1. 
 The positive abnormal returns over the 100 trading days prior to the demerger 
announcement are a phenomenon that is difficult to explain.  By definition, the demerger 
announcement reaches the market at day zero.  The positive abnormal returns leading up to 
the demerger announcement might be due to market inefficiencies; for example, chief 
executives may inadvertently advertise possible restructuring activities to institutions well 
ahead of the public announcement.  Another possible explanation is that the market 
anticipated some corporate restructuring activities. 
 
 
 
                                                 
16  These results are statistically significant at the 5% and 10% levels respectively. 
17  In the following, ‘statistically significant’ denotes the statistical significance at the 5% level unless 
otherwise stated. 
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Table 2:  Pre-Announcement Performance 
 
 
 
Figure 1:  Pre-Announcement Performance:  Standard Demerger 
 
5.2. Announcement effect 
 
A time window of 21 days ranging from 10 days before and after the announcement date is 
used to estimate the effect of demerger announcements on shareholder wealth.  It was 
established that, for standard demergers, the announcement effect is +4% for the two-day 
mean 
N
Total -1.4%  2.2%  -1.6%  5.9%  14.8%  -44.6% ** 14.1%  
400 - 301 -1.3%  -0.3%  2.6%  -3.3%  -0.2%  -9.7% * -1.3%  
300 - 201 -6.3% *** -5.5% *** -3.9% * -7.1% ** -3.4%  -15.0% * -4.2% *
200 - 101 -4.7% ** -5.0% * -4.9% ** -5.1%  5.6%  -12.9% * -1.3%  
100 - 51 3.1%  5.2% ** 5.0% * 5.4%  0.9%  -10.8%  8.8% **
50 - 11 1.6%  2.5%  -3.0%  8.0%  0.7%  -4.7%  4.7%  
 10 - 1 6.3% *** 5.3% *** 2.7% * 8.0% *** 11.2% ** 8.6%  7.5% ***
abnormal returns for selected time windows before announcement date (announcement at day 0)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Small 
Executed 
Demerger
All Demergers Standard 
Demerger
Large 
Executed 
Demerger
Technical 
Demerger
Aborted 
Demerger
Fixed sample 
Standard 
demerger
48 38 19 19 5 5 21
-12%
-10%
-8%
-6%
-4%
-2%
0%
2%
4%
400 387 374 361 348 335 322 309 296 283 270 257 244 231 218 205 192 179 166 153 140 127 114 101 8
8 75 62 49 36 23 10
number of trading days before demerger announcement (announcement at day 0)
C
A
R
 i
n
 %
Pre-Announcement Performance
Standard Demerger (n=38)
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period (day 0 to day +1), and +5% for the four-day period (day –2 through to day +1)18.  The 
respective median values are +2% and +3%.  Over the longest time span under investigation 
(day –10 to day +10), the average return of the demerger announcement is +5% for the 
unadjusted and +4% for the market-adjusted model19.  About 23% of all demerger 
announcements are in negative territory, indicating that not all demergers necessarily 
guarantee success.  The box-plot (Figure 2) depicts the positively skewed distribution of 
results for the time window from day –2 through to day +1. 
 
 
Figure 2:  Distribution of Annoucement Effects for 4-Day Time Window 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Looking at the various strata, small firms that decided to demerge appear to create more value 
than larger ones.  The announcement effect for small firms is with +6.8% (median +5.1%) 
about 3% higher than for large firms with a positive announcement effect of +3.8% (median 
+1.9%).  This is in line with the above-discussed research that established similar results for 
the US.  Technical demergers resulted in a statistically significant return of about +7.6%, the 
fixed sample returned +6.3% (median +6.5%) for the same time window.  Table 3 again 
summarises the results and Figure 3 illustrates them. 
                                                 
18  Both results are statistically significant at the 1% level, and are very similar for both raw and market 
adjusted returns. 
19  The results are statistically significant at the 1% and 5% levels respectively. 
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Table 3:  Demerger Announcement Effects 
 
 
Figure 3:  Announcement Effect for Standard Demerger 
 
 
-2%
-1%
0%
1%
2%
3%
4%
5%
R
et
ur
ns
 in
 %
Raw Return 0.89% 0.13% 0.04% 0.05% 0.06% 0.14% -0.16% 0.00% 0.53% 0.82% 3.90% 0.23% -1.20% -0.14% -0.32% 0.59% 0.29% -0.54% 0.06% -0.04% -0.20%
Abnormal Return 0.88% 0.14% -0.09% -0.02% -0.13% -0.07% -0.27% -0.05% 0.59% 0.65% 3.85% 0.20% -1.24% -0.33% -0.42% 0.42% 0.02% -0.50% -0.05% 0.18% -0.21%
p: RR 0.03 0.49 0.82 0.89 0.78 0.63 0.43 0.99 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.60 0.01 0.58 0.10 0.02 0.22 0.08 0.76 0.84 0.52
p: AR 0.02 0.39 0.60 0.96 0.58 0.80 0.20 0.82 0.03 0.03 0.00 0.66 0.01 0.14 0.03 0.11 0.94 0.09 0.79 0.34 0.50
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Distribution of Returns At and Around 
Announcement Date for Standard Demerger (n=38)
time 
window
N
 0 / +1 4.1% *** 4.1% *** 2.8% ** 5.4% *** 4.9%  3.1%  5.0% ***
 -1 / 1 5.4% *** 4.9% *** 3.5% *** 6.4% *** 7.8% * 6.8%  6.0% ***
 -2 / 1 6.1% *** 5.5% *** 3.6% *** 7.3% *** 8.9% ** 7.9%  6.6% ***
 -3 / 3 5.2% *** 4.1% *** 2.4% * 5.9% ** 8.3% ** 10.7%  6.8% ***
 -5 / 5 5.5% *** 4.4% *** 2.8% * 5.9% ** 8.1% * 11.1%  7.1% ***
 -10 / 10 5.6% *** 5.1% *** 1.6%  8.6% *** 6.3%  8.8%  7.5% ***
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
48 38 19 19
All 
Demergers
Standard 
Demerger
Large 
Demerger
Small 
Demerger
Technical 
Demerger
Aborted 
Demerger
Fixed 
sample - 
Standard 
5 5 21
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5.3. Ex-date effect 
 
A five-day period from day 0 to day +5 is used to estimate the ex-date effect of a demerger.  
Vijh (1994, p. 581) claims that “the spin-off ex-date return arises because the parent and 
subsidiary stocks attract different investors who prefer to buy the separated shares at ex-
date”.  Vijh, amongst others, has found positive abnormal returns for the spin-off on the ex-
date.  Table 4 depicts the positive abnormal returns for both the parent and spin-off.  In this 
respect, day 0 is defined as the day prior to the first trading day and reflects the exchange 
ratio set by the investment bank. 
 For both the parent firm and the spin-off firm, the results are positive but not 
statistically significant.  In conclusion, Vijh’s proposition of a significantly positive abnormal 
return at ex-date cannot be supported. 
 
 
Table 4:  Demerger Ex-Date Effect 
 
5.4. Post-demerger transaction 
 
A period of 780 trading days was chosen to establish possible differences in the long-run 
value creation characteristics of the parent and spin-off firms.   
 
a. Overall effect 
 
Examining Table 5, it appears that standard demergers on average outperform the market by 
about +4% in the three years following the break-up.  This result is statistically insignificant.  
This must lead to the conclusion that the market has, on average, correctly anticipated the 
value creation of a demerger at the announcement date.  The median value of +12% for this 
Parent Spin-off
N 34 41
1 1.01% 3.54%
2 0.34% -0.29%
3 0.38% -0.24%
4 0.40% 0.04%
5 0.38% -0.38%
abnormal returns on trading day t after execution date
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05)
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three-year period, as shown in Appendix 3, is considerably higher than the mean indicating 
the existence of negative outliers.  However, the picture looks noticeably different when 
viewed by the various subgroups.  Whilst large firms20 underperformed the market by -
20%21, small demergers outperformed the market by +26%22.   
 Another feature of the post-demerger period is the underperformance of standard 
demergers in the first 100 trading days.  This also holds true for small demergers.  Although 
large firms consistently underperformed the market over the entire period, value creation in 
other sub-groups was mainly confined to the trading period of day 300-599.  This period of 
value creation corresponds to year 2 and the first half of year 3 following the demerger. 
 Not all demergers create value over the post transaction period.  About one third23 of 
all parent and spin-off firms combined underperformed the market over the investigation 
period.  This reiterates the point that a demerger per se does not guarantee success. 
 
 
Table 5:  Long-Term Performance of Both Parent 
and Spin-Off Combined 
                                                 
20  Pre-demerger selection period. 
21  The result being very weakly significant with t=1.69. 
22  Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
23  Exactly 32.4% of all firms underperformed the market over the investigation period. 
time 
window
N N N N
Total 4.2%  34 -20.0%  16 25.7%  18 -1.8%  21
0 - 99 -7.3% * 34 -2.6%  16 -11.5% * 18 -2.8%  21
100 - 199 1.3%  34 -2.2%  16 4.3%  18 0.9%  21
200 - 299 -0.3%  34 -0.6%  16 0.1%  18 -3.8%  21
300 - 399 2.6%  34 -2.2%  16 6.9%  18 -0.2%  21
400 - 499 5.5%  33 -4.4%  16 14.8% ** 17 6.8%  21
500 - 599 4.1%  31 -1.0%  15 8.9%  16 1.2%  21
600 - 699 -0.3%  27 -7.0%  15 8.0%  12 -1.4%  21
Combined value creation following execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Standard 
Demerger
Large 
Demerger (pre-
demerger 
selection)
Small 
Demerger (pre-
demerger 
selection)
Fixed sample - 
Standard 
demerger
mean mean mean mean
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b. Parent 
 
The level and characteristics of value creation of the parent firm and spin-off firm will now 
be addressed in isolation.  The parent firm is defined as the constituent part of the demerger 
that retained the original name of the pre-demerger firm24; its break-up market value is, on 
average, about two thirds of the combined entity. 
 As shown in Table 6, the value creation or destruction for standard demergers over 
three years following the demerger is negligible.  On average, the parent underperformed the 
market by –6%, with a median value of +7%, indicating a strong negatively skewed 
distribution.  In the first 100 trading days, and over the period between the 200th and 300th 
trading day, the parent firm underperformed the market.  Between the 400th and 600th day, it 
then performed better once compared with the market.  After three years, very diverging 
results can be seen for the individual firms, with results ranging from a cumulative abnormal 
return of –246% to +171%.   
 Overall, the worst performing period was the 200 to 299 day period, whereas the best 
performing interval was between trading day 400 and 499.  The detailed results for the parent 
firm are depicted in Table 6 and Appendix 3 respectively.  Overall, demergers do not 
guarantee success for the parent firm, as 41% of them underperformed the market.  Some of 
those parent firms underperformed the market substantially. 
 
                                                 
24  In some instances, both parts of the demerger changed their name; in this case the larger part (in terms 
of market value) was defined as the parent firm. 
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Table 6:  Long-term Parent Performance 
 
 
c. Spin-off 
 
The spin-off is normally the smaller of the demerged parts of the firm that did not retain the 
name.  Its break-up market value is on average less than a third of the combined market value 
of the parent and spin-off.  The spin-off appears to have been more successful in the three 
years following the break-up than the parent firm.  All standard spin-offs outperformed the 
market25 by +17%.  Spin-offs performed better than the market in all but the first and last 
periods under investigation, with the strongest gain26 of +9% from day 400 – 499.  However, 
not all spin-offs succeeded over the period of analysis.  Some spin-offs fared extremely well 
with a maximum cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of +139%, whereas others did very 
poorly with a CAR of –99%.  About 31% of all spin-offs underperformed when compared to 
the market.  A high degree of variance in the spin-off sample was detected, albeit smaller 
than for the parent firms. 
 In a similar vein to the parent firms, the spin-offs of large firms (pre-demerger 
selection) performed worse than those of small firms.  However, the performance effects are 
not significantly different from zero for the 780 trading day window following the execution 
date.  Small firms, on the other hand, outperformed the market by more than +45%, with the 
median value of +39%27.  Analysing the individual time windows in more detail, it becomes 
apparent that these small firms’ spin-offs outperformed the market in every interval, with the 
                                                 
25  At the 10% significance level. 
26  Again at the 10% significance level. 
27  This result is statistically significant at the 1% level. 
time 
window
N N N N N N
Total -5.9%  34 -29.4% * 15 18.5%  18 -16.4%  16 9.2%  17 -12.0%  21
0 - 99 -4.9%  34 -0.7%  15 -8.0%  18 -1.7%  16 -7.5%  17 -1.1%  21
100 - 199 1.2%  34 -2.5%  15 4.5%  18 -0.1%  16 2.7%  17 1.0%  21
200 - 299 -3.2%  31 -4.1%  14 -1.4%  16 -0.4%  14 -4.6%  16 -5.7%  21
300 - 399 -0.3%  29 -0.9%  14 1.5%  14 -4.2%  14 4.8%  14 -3.0%  21
400 - 499 4.0%  28 -7.9%  14 15.9% ** 13 0.2%  14 7.2%  13 4.9%  21
500 - 599 6.4%  27 -6.6%  13 20.9%  13 -2.4%  13 16.7%  13 3.3%  21
600 - 699 -4.6%  25 -6.4%  13 1.2%  11 -8.0%  13 2.9%  11 -5.4%  21
Combined value creation following execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
(abnormal returns for various time windows)
Small Demerger 
(pre-demerger 
selection)
Large Demerger 
(post-demerger 
selection)
meanmean meanmean
Standard 
Demerger
Large Demerger 
(pre-demerger 
selection)
Small Demerger 
(post-demerger 
selection)
mean
Fixed sample - 
Standard 
demerger
mean
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exception of the first 100 trading days.  Over the periods 300 – 399 and 400 – 499, the CAR 
is +12% and +19% for the respective intervals28.   
 Large spin-offs gain on average by +7%29, with a high median value of +22% 
indicating a strong negatively skewed result.  Small spin-offs, in contrast, outperform the 
market30 by +27%.  The very best time window for small spin-offs was the period between 
day 400 and 499 when they outperformed the market by +19% (median +16%)31.  The fixed 
sample yields a cumulative abnormal return of +25% over the same period.  To summarise, 
spin-offs account for most of the value creation in the post-demerger period.   
 Figure 4 gives an overview of the post-demerger performance of standard demergers. 
 
 
Table 7:  Long-Term Spin-Off Performance 
 
 
                                                 
28  The returns are statistically significant at the 5% level or better. 
29  Statistically insignificant. 
30  Significant at the 10% level:  t=1.92. 
31  The results being statistically significant at the 1% level. 
time 
window
N N N N N N
Total 17.3% * 41 -5.9%  21 44.8% *** 19 7.5%  20 26.7% * 21 24.9% * 23
0 - 99 -4.2%  41 0.2%  21 -9.8%  19 -9.6%  20 0.9%  21 3.7%  23
100 - 199 4.2%  41 -1.0%  21 8.4%  19 3.3%  20 5.1%  21 5.9%  23
200 - 299 3.8%  41 0.0%  21 8.9%  19 3.7%  20 3.9%  21 4.7%  23
300 - 399 4.6%  40 -1.9%  21 11.8% * 18 5.9%  20 3.3%  20 4.0%  23
400 - 499 9.4% * 38 2.1%  20 18.9% ** 17 -0.3%  19 19.1% *** 19 5.8%  23
500 - 599 0.2%  35 -1.6%  19 3.2%  15 2.6%  18 -2.4%  17 -2.9%  23
600 - 699 -0.6%  31 -7.4%  18 11.3%  12 -0.9%  16 -0.3%  15 -0.3%  23
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date
(abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Small Demerger 
(post-demerger 
selection)
Fixed sample - 
Standard 
demerger
mean mean mean mean mean mean
Standard 
Demergers
Large Demerger 
(pre-demerger 
selection)
Small Demerger 
(pre-demerger 
selection)
Large Demerger 
(post-demerger 
selection)
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Figure 4:  Long-term Performance of Parent and Spin-off 
 
 
d. Size 
 
Comparing the above data on the performance effects for both large and small demergers 
with size defined at the announcement date, it can be seen that demergers by small firms 
outperform larger ones with a considerable margin at any stage over the investigation period.  
Over the pre-announcement period, small demergers outperformed their larger peers on 
average by +7.4% (median:  +10.0%); at and around the announcement date32 by +3.0% 
(+3.2%).  For the three years following the demerger transaction, the group of small parent 
firms outperformed the larger group on average by +47.9% (+34.5%), with small spin-offs 
outperforming larger spin-offs by +50.7% (+27.1%).  In addition, the sample was divided 
into large and small firms by their market value on the execution date to establish whether the 
size of the new independent entities had an impact on the overall demerger performance.  
Again, size appears to be a decisive factor for the parent firm’s success.  Small parent firms 
outperformed larger ones by +25.6%, with a positive median value of +10.1%.  For spin-offs, 
the evidence is mixed.  Whereas the mean value indicates a better performance of small spin-
                                                 
32  For the three-day period from day –2 to +1. 
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offs compared to large ones, the median value point s in the opposite direction with –6.0% 
over the entire period of 780 trading days after the ex-date.   
 
e. Takeover likelihood 
 
Cusatis, Miles and Woolridge (1993) established that most of the value gains in their sample 
was due to the higher takeover likelihood of spin-offs once compared to a control group.  It is 
therefore of great interest to determine whether part, if not all, of the value creation in the 
demerger process stems from takeover premiums.  Although it is impossible to establish the 
impact of takeovers on the announcement effect, it is possible to evaluate their impact on the 
post-demerger performance by comparing the full sample with a sample of firms that were 
not taken over.  To this end, all those firms that were taken over in the three years after the 
demerger33 were removed from the second sample, thereby creating a control group.  The 
results can be seen in Table 8 below.  They indicate that takeover activity had only a 
relatively small, statistically insignificant, impact on post-demerger performance.  For the 
“post-demerger” sample, where size is defined on the ex-date, small parent firms are on 
average about 6.4% less successful once the influence of takeovers were excluded from the 
sample; spin-offs on the other hand were 1.9% more successful.  Large spin-offs were even 
more successful improving their post-demerger performance by 3.9% to 11.4%34.  In contrast, 
the results for large parent firms were positively influenced by takeover activity, improving 
the overall negative results by 1.6%.  This implies that those spin-offs that were taken over 
were in fact underperforming relative to the market, with the reverse being true for parent 
firms.  Overall, takeover activity cannot explain the full abnormal returns observed. 
 
                                                 
33  Naturally, only firms that were taken over in the 780 trading days following the ex-date were excluded 
from the sample. 
34  Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
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Table 8:  Relative Performance Impact of Takeovers on Sample 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
A statistically significant positive average share price reaction of +5.5% is demonstrated for 
the demerger announcement35.  This is in line with similar findings, for example by Hite and 
Owers (1983) in a US study, which showed a +3.3% positive announcement effect.   
 Demerger announcements are preceded by a period of considerable underperformance 
relative to the market.  It was shown, however, that this trend reversed approximately 100 
trading days before the demerger announcement, and on average all of the value lost was in 
turn recovered.  In contrast to Vijh (1994), no statistically significant ex-date effect for both 
parent and spin-off could be demonstrated.   
 Over the 780 trading days (or three years) after the demerger, the combined 
performance of parent and spin-off returned a statistically insignificant abnormal return of 
+4.2%.  The performance of parent and spin-off was substantially different.  While the spin-
off outperformed the market by a statistically significant +17.3% over this period, the parent 
firm underperformed the market by –5.9%, albeit this latter result was statistically 
insignificant.   
 It was also demonstrated that there are important performance differences between the 
various demerger subgroups.  Small demergers, for example, were far more successful than 
large ones. 
                                                 
35  For the four-day period from day –2 through to day +1. 
Large Firms delta mean
parent 1.6%
spin off -3.9%
Small Firms delta mean
parent 6.4%
spin off -1.9%
performance differences of demergers 
excluding takeover influences relative to full sample
all results are statically insignificant
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Appendices 
 
Appendix 1:  Pre-Announcement Performance 
 
 
 
 
time window median stdev. p n
Total -3.4% -1.4%  (0.39) 0.81 48
400 - 301 -2.4% -1.3%  (0.15) 0.55 48
300 - 201 -5.4% -6.3% *** (0.11) 0.00 48
200 - 101 -3.3% -4.7% ** (0.15) 0.04 48
100 - 51 3.6% 3.1%  (0.16) 0.20 48
50 - 11 -0.8% 1.6%  (0.19) 0.57 48
 10 - 1 4.5% 6.3% *** (0.10) 0.00 48
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. p n
Total 4.9% 2.2%  (0.38) 0.73 38
400 - 301 -1.3% -0.3%  (0.16) 0.90 38
300 - 201 -4.5% -5.5% *** (0.11) 0.00 38
200 - 101 -4.1% -5.0% * (0.16) 0.06 38
100 - 51 4.2% 5.2% ** (0.15) 0.04 38
50 - 11 -0.2% 2.5%  (0.21) 0.46 38
 10 - 1 3.6% 5.3% *** (0.09) 0.00 38
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. p n
Total -3.6% -1.6%  (0.20) 0.74 19
400 - 301 2.0% 2.6%  (0.12) 0.36 19
300 - 201 -3.7% -3.9% * (0.08) 0.05 19
200 - 101 -5.5% -4.9% ** (0.10) 0.04 19
100 - 51 4.1% 5.0% * (0.13) 0.10 19
50 - 11 -1.7% -3.0%  (0.10) 0.20 19
 10 - 1 3.1% 2.7% * (0.06) 0.06 19
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. p n
Total 6.4% 5.9%  (0.51) 0.62 19
400 - 301 -5.5% -3.3%  (0.19) 0.47 19
300 - 201 -6.7% -7.1% ** (0.12) 0.02 19
200 - 101 -3.3% -5.1%  (0.21) 0.30 19
100 - 51 5.5% 5.4%  (0.18) 0.21 19
50 - 11 -0.1% 8.0%  (0.27) 0.21 19
 10 - 1 3.7% 8.0% *** (0.12) 0.01 19
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Large Demerger
mean
All Demergers
mean
Standard Demerger
mean
Small Demerger
mean
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time window median stdev. p n
Total 8.6% 14.8%  (0.24) 0.24 5
400 - 301 0.8% -0.2%  (0.05) 0.92 5
300 - 201 -6.8% -3.4%  (0.08) 0.40 5
200 - 101 6.5% 5.6%  (0.08) 0.19 5
100 - 51 4.7% 0.9%  (0.11) 0.86 5
50 - 11 1.9% 0.7%  (0.05) 0.78 5
10 - 0 12.0% 11.2% ** (0.08) 0.03 5
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. p n
Total -59.2% -44.6% ** (0.34) 0.04 5
400 - 301 -12.9% -9.7% * (0.09) 0.08 5
300 - 201 -8.2% -15.0% * (0.15) 0.09 5
200 - 101 -13.9% -12.9% * (0.11) 0.06 5
100 - 51 -6.0% -10.8%  (0.24) 0.37 5
50 - 11 -6.1% -4.7%  (0.09) 0.32 5
10 - 0 7.0% 8.6%  (0.13) 0.21 5
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. p n
Total 8.3% 14.1%  (0.39) 0.12 21
400 - 301 0.4% -1.3%  (0.16) 0.71 21
300 - 201 -2.8% -4.2% * (0.10) 0.06 21
200 - 101 -2.3% -1.3%  (0.11) 0.57 21
100 - 51 4.2% 8.8% ** (0.16) 0.02 21
50 - 11 -1.7% 4.7%  (0.27) 0.43 21
10 - 0 5.1% 7.5% *** (0.11) 0.01 21
abnormal returns for selected time windows before demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Fixed Sample - Standard Demerger
mean
Technical Demerger
mean
Aborted Demerger
mean
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Appendix 2:  Announcement Effects 
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.3% 4.1% *** (0.08) -0.18 0.28 48
 -1 / 1 2.6% 5.4% *** (0.08) -0.06 0.29 48
 -2 / 1 4.1% 6.1% *** (0.08) -0.05 0.29 48
 -3 / 3 3.1% 5.2% *** (0.08) -0.07 0.29 48
 -5 / 5 4.7% 5.5% *** (0.09) -0.08 0.37 48
 -10 / 10 3.6% 5.6% *** (0.11) -0.12 0.33 48
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.3% 4.1% *** (0.07) -0.05 0.22 38
 -1 / 1 2.4% 4.9% *** (0.07) -0.06 0.26 38
 -2 / 1 2.9% 5.5% *** (0.07) -0.05 0.29 38
 -3 / 3 1.9% 4.1% *** (0.08) -0.07 0.27 38
 -5 / 5 2.4% 4.4% *** (0.08) -0.08 0.24 38
 -10 / 10 3.6% 5.1% *** (0.11) -0.12 0.33 38
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.3% 2.8% ** (0.04) -0.05 0.12 19
 -1 / 1 2.4% 3.5% *** (0.05) -0.06 0.15 19
 -2 / 1 2.9% 3.6% *** (0.05) -0.05 0.15 19
 -3 / 3 1.9% 2.4% * (0.06) -0.07 0.15 19
 -5 / 5 2.4% 2.8% * (0.07) -0.08 0.19 19
 -10 / 10 3.6% 1.6%  (0.08) -0.12 0.17 19
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.5% 5.4% *** (0.08) -0.04 0.22 19
 -1 / 1 2.5% 6.4% *** (0.09) -0.03 0.26 19
 -2 / 1 6.0% 7.3% *** (0.09) -0.02 0.29 19
 -3 / 3 4.7% 5.9% ** (0.09) -0.06 0.27 19
 -5 / 5 6.3% 5.9% ** (0.10) -0.06 0.24 19
 -10 / 10 9.5% 8.6% *** (0.12) -0.12 0.33 19
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.7% 4.9%  (0.09) -0.06 0.18 5
 -1 / 1 8.9% 7.8% * (0.08) 0.00 0.19 5
 -2 / 1 8.9% 8.9% ** (0.06) 0.01 0.18 5
 -3 / 3 7.9% 8.3% ** (0.07) 0.00 0.18 5
 -5 / 5 5.8% 8.1% * (0.07) 0.01 0.18 5
 -10 / 10 2.8% 6.3%  (0.12) -0.03 0.28 5
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
All Demergers
Standard Demerger
Large Demerger
Small Demerger
Technical Demerger
mean
mean
mean
mean
mean
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time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 0.6% 3.1%  (0.17) -0.18 0.28 5
 -1 / 1 4.1% 6.8%  (0.13) -0.05 0.29 5
 -2 / 1 5.2% 7.9%  (0.13) -0.05 0.28 5
 -3 / 3 9.9% 10.7%  (0.12) -0.03 0.29 5
 -5 / 5 8.0% 11.1%  (0.16) -0.07 0.37 5
 -10 / 10 9.1% 8.8%  (0.14) -0.07 0.30 5
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
 0 / +1 2.7% 5.0% *** (0.05) -0.04 0.17 21
 -1 / 1 4.6% 6.0% *** (0.07) -0.03 0.26 21
 -2 / 1 6.0% 6.6% *** (0.08) -0.03 0.29 21
 -3 / 3 5.8% 6.8% *** (0.07) -0.02 0.27 21
 -5 / 5 6.6% 7.1% *** (0.07) -0.03 0.20 21
 -10 / 10 5.1% 7.5% *** (0.10) -0.07 0.33 21
abnormal returns for selected time windows at and around demerger announcement
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
mean
Fixed Sample - Standard Demerger
Aborted Demerger
mean
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Appendix 3:  Post-Demerger Performance 
 
a. Combined Effect 
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 11.8% 4.2%  (0.60) -1.58 1.34 34
0 - 99 -1.3% -7.3% * (0.21) -0.65 0.19 34
100 - 199 0.0% 1.3%  (0.21) -0.51 0.59 34
200 - 299 -0.1% -0.3%  (0.16) -0.30 0.52 34
300 - 399 0.3% 2.6%  (0.25) -0.75 0.72 34
400 - 499 4.5% 5.5%  (0.25) -0.83 0.78 33
500 - 599 3.0% 4.1%  (0.22) -0.45 0.56 31
600 - 699 0.0% -0.3%  (0.29) -0.51 1.16 27
Combined value creation following the execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total -7.2% -20.0%  (0.47) -1.15 0.41 16
0 - 99 -3.6% -2.6%  (0.13) -0.20 0.19 16
100 - 199 -0.4% -2.2%  (0.12) -0.31 0.14 16
200 - 299 -0.3% -0.6%  (0.09) -0.14 0.19 16
300 - 399 -5.3% -2.2%  (0.14) -0.31 0.22 16
400 - 499 -0.9% -4.4%  (0.23) -0.83 0.18 16
500 - 599 3.0% -1.0%  (0.15) -0.34 0.20 15
600 - 699 -0.1% -7.0%  (0.18) -0.51 0.15 15
Combined value creation following the execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 17.5% 25.7%  (0.63) -1.58 1.34 18
0 - 99 -0.1% -11.5% * (0.27) -0.65 0.16 18
100 - 199 0.3% 4.3%  (0.26) -0.51 0.59 18
200 - 299 1.3% 0.1%  (0.20) -0.30 0.52 18
300 - 399 6.0% 6.9%  (0.31) -0.75 0.72 18
400 - 499 12.4% 14.8% ** (0.24) -0.22 0.78 17
500 - 599 2.9% 8.9%  (0.26) -0.45 0.56 16
600 - 699 2.7% 8.0%  (0.38) -0.41 1.16 12
Combined value creation following the execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 11.5% -1.8%  (0.69) -1.58 1.34 21
0 - 99 4.4% -2.8%  (0.19) -0.65 0.19 21
100 - 199 0.1% 0.9%  (0.15) -0.25 0.46 21
200 - 299 -5.2% -3.8%  (0.14) -0.30 0.27 21
300 - 399 -4.1% -0.2%  (0.26) -0.75 0.47 21
400 - 499 11.1% 6.8%  (0.31) -0.83 0.78 21
500 - 599 3.0% 1.2%  (0.24) -0.45 0.56 21
600 - 699 -5.2% -1.4%  (0.33) -0.51 1.16 21
Combined value creation following the execution date (abnormal returns for various time windows)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Small Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
Fixed Sample - Standard Demerger
mean
Standard Demerger
mean
Large Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
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b. Parent 
 
 
 
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 6.9% -5.9%  (0.79) -2.46 1.71 34
0 - 99 -2.0% -4.9%  (0.20) -0.63 0.28 34
100 - 199 2.8% 1.2%  (0.25) -0.51 0.72 34
200 - 299 -4.8% -3.2%  (0.21) -0.46 0.51 31
300 - 399 -0.1% -0.3%  (0.32) -1.13 0.81 29
400 - 499 6.1% 4.0%  (0.28) -1.03 0.47 28
500 - 599 -0.5% 6.4%  (0.37) -0.54 1.33 27
600 - 699 -4.8% -4.6%  (0.23) -0.49 0.66 25
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total -22.0% -29.4% * (0.60) -1.86 0.55 15
0 - 99 -1.3% -0.7%  (0.16) -0.24 0.28 15
100 - 199 -1.0% -2.5%  (0.17) -0.41 0.19 15
200 - 299 -7.0% -4.1%  (0.14) -0.35 0.21 14
300 - 399 -5.8% -0.9%  (0.21) -0.35 0.34 14
400 - 499 -4.3% -7.9%  (0.29) -1.03 0.15 14
500 - 599 -5.4% -6.6%  (0.23) -0.54 0.23 13
600 - 699 -4.8% -6.4%  (0.17) -0.49 0.14 13
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 12.5% 18.5%  (0.87) -2.46 1.71 18
0 - 99 -2.0% -8.0%  (0.23) -0.63 0.24 18
100 - 199 3.8% 4.5%  (0.31) -0.51 0.72 18
200 - 299 0.1% -1.4%  (0.25) -0.46 0.51 16
300 - 399 6.8% 1.5%  (0.42) -1.13 0.81 14
400 - 499 19.3% 15.9% ** (0.22) -0.43 0.47 13
500 - 599 2.6% 20.9%  (0.45) -0.28 1.33 13
600 - 699 0.2% 1.2%  (0.27) -0.37 0.66 11
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 2.7% -16.4%  (0.39) -0.92 0.39 16
0 - 99 -1.4% -1.7%  (0.14) -0.24 0.26 16
100 - 199 2.8% -0.1%  (0.12) -0.24 0.14 16
200 - 299 -1.0% -0.4%  (0.11) -0.16 0.21 14
300 - 399 -7.3% -4.2%  (0.21) -0.35 0.34 14
400 - 499 -2.0% 0.2%  (0.09) -0.12 0.14 14
500 - 599 -0.2% -2.4%  (0.19) -0.34 0.23 13
600 - 699 -7.5% -8.0%  (0.17) -0.49 0.13 13
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Standard Demerger
mean
Large Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
Small Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
Large Demerger (post-demerger selection)
mean
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time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 12.9% 9.2%  (1.03) -2.46 1.71 17
0 - 99 -2.5% -7.5%  (0.25) -0.63 0.28 17
100 - 199 3.8% 2.7%  (0.34) -0.51 0.72 17
200 - 299 -7.7% -4.6%  (0.27) -0.46 0.51 16
300 - 399 6.8% 4.8%  (0.42) -1.13 0.81 14
400 - 499 19.3% 7.2%  (0.40) -1.03 0.47 13
500 - 599 -0.5% 16.7%  (0.50) -0.54 1.33 13
600 - 699 0.6% 2.9%  (0.27) -0.37 0.66 11
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 6.6% -12.0%  (0.89) -2.46 1.71 21
0 - 99 1.9% -1.1%  (0.19) -0.63 0.28 21
100 - 199 3.8% 1.0%  (0.16) -0.41 0.25 21
200 - 299 -6.9% -5.7%  (0.17) -0.46 0.24 21
300 - 399 -0.1% -3.0%  (0.33) -1.13 0.43 21
400 - 499 6.4% 4.9%  (0.29) -1.03 0.47 21
500 - 599 -5.4% 3.3%  (0.39) -0.54 1.33 21
600 - 699 -7.5% -5.4%  (0.23) -0.49 0.66 21
Value creation and destruction by the parent following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Small Demerger (post-demerger selection)
mean
Fixed Sample - Standard Demerger
mean
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c. Spin-off 
 
 
 
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 18.6% 17.3% * (0.59) -0.99 1.39 41
0 - 99 0.4% -4.2%  (0.33) -1.06 0.82 41
100 - 199 6.5% 4.2%  (0.27) -0.58 0.89 41
200 - 299 1.9% 3.8%  (0.20) -0.35 0.56 41
300 - 399 2.5% 4.6%  (0.21) -0.36 0.61 40
400 - 499 6.0% 9.4% * (0.30) -0.73 0.95 38
500 - 599 4.5% 0.2%  (0.24) -0.60 0.33 35
600 - 699 0.3% -0.6%  (0.36) -0.71 1.37 31
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 11.5% -5.9%  (0.49) -0.99 0.62 21
0 - 99 2.9% 0.2%  (0.18) -0.48 0.32 21
100 - 199 3.8% -1.0%  (0.19) -0.58 0.22 21
200 - 299 1.9% 0.0%  (0.11) -0.21 0.18 21
300 - 399 -3.2% -1.9%  (0.16) -0.36 0.24 21
400 - 499 2.8% 2.1%  (0.29) -0.73 0.49 20
500 - 599 1.2% -1.6%  (0.23) -0.60 0.31 19
600 - 699 -2.6% -7.4%  (0.29) -0.71 0.36 18
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total 38.6% 44.8% ***
(0.59)
-0.64 1.39 19
0 - 99 -8.3% -9.8%  (0.45) -1.06 0.82 19
100 - 199 7.3% 8.4%  (0.34) -0.51 0.89 19
200 - 299 6.3% 8.9%  (0.26) -0.35 0.56 19
300 - 399 7.5% 11.8% * (0.24) -0.19 0.61 18
400 - 499 10.5% 18.9% ** (0.29) -0.26 0.95 17
500 - 599 6.2% 3.2%  (0.25) -0.55 0.33 15
600 - 699 2.6% 11.3%  (0.46) -0.59 1.37 12
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 22.3% 7.5%  (0.53) -0.99 0.94 20
0 - 99 2.9% -9.6%  (0.30) -1.06 0.15 20
100 - 199 4.8% 3.3%  (0.19) -0.58 0.35 20
200 - 299 3.3% 3.7%  (0.16) -0.25 0.52 20
300 - 399 3.9% 5.9%  (0.20) -0.33 0.61 20
400 - 499 -0.7% -0.3%  (0.30) -0.73 0.49 19
500 - 599 3.7% 2.6%  (0.22) -0.60 0.33 18
600 - 699 3.6% -0.9%  (0.27) -0.67 0.36 16
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Standard Demerger
mean
Large Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
Small Demerger (pre-demerger selection)
mean
Large Demerger (post-demerger selection)
mean
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time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 16.2% 26.7% * (0.63) -0.78 1.39 21
0 - 99 -2.1% 0.9%  (0.36) -0.66 0.82 21
100 - 199 3.6% 5.1%  (0.33) -0.51 0.89 21
200 - 299 -5.5% 3.9%  (0.23) -0.35 0.56 21
300 - 399 -0.2% 3.3%  (0.22) -0.36 0.53 20
400 - 499 10.5% 19.1% *** (0.26) -0.11 0.95 19
500 - 599 4.5% -2.4%  (0.25) -0.55 0.31 17
600 - 699 -0.5% -0.3%  (0.46) -0.71 1.37 15
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
time window median stdev. min max n
Total (0 - 780) 23.7% 24.9% * (0.66) -0.99 1.39 23
0 - 99 5.3% 3.7%  (0.26) -0.66 0.78 23
100 - 199 3.9% 5.9%  (0.27) -0.43 0.89 23
200 - 299 4.2% 4.7%  (0.22) -0.35 0.56 23
300 - 399 2.9% 4.0%  (0.21) -0.36 0.53 23
400 - 499 2.4% 5.8%  (0.33) -0.73 0.95 23
500 - 599 1.3% -2.9%  (0.26) -0.60 0.31 23
600 - 699 1.9% -0.3%  (0.42) -0.71 1.37 23
Value creation and destruction by the spin-off following the execution date (abnormal returns)
*: significant at the 10% level (p<0.1) **: 5% level (p<0.05) ***: 1% level (p<0.01)
Small Demerger (post-demerger selection)
mean
Fixed Sample - Standard Demerger
mean
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Appendix 4:  Figure for Pre-demerger Performance 
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Appendix 5:  Figure for Post-Demerger Performance 
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